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Abstract: Datocracy is a compound neologism that embraces transhistorical 
liberations and reconfigurations of data, in its multiple perceptual-linguistic forms, 
into new value relations and systems of governance, democratic or otherwise. 
Datocracy evolves from the often-violent separation of data from its habitual 
matrices, by virtue of dispositifs, or apparatuses, as defined by Michel Foucault and 
elaborated by Gilles Deleuze. This paper examines material examples of the 
functioning of such dispositifs through Georges Bataille, Walter Benjamin, François 
Rabelais (through Mikhail Bakhtin), and William Burroughs. These examples 
demonstrate how emancipated data is readily recuperated into new relations of 
governance, as liberatory socio-political tools (or apparatuses), or vehicles of tyranny. 
In its passage between liberation and recuperation, in its state of utterance, perhaps, 
data experiences a protosemantic moment, a pre-definitional state, which offers the 
promise of a momentary escape from, or rather within, value relations. 
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Datocracy evolves from the separation or liberation of data (in all its myriad 
forms, cultural or otherwise), allowing for its reconfiguration by everyman 
and dictator alike into new value relations.1 The dispositif, or apparatus, in its 
dynamic connective function, allows for singular gestures to reproduce 
transhistorically and imperially beyond their site of origin. In the first 
instance this requires an act of separation, in which a certain violence is 
implied. This paper examines (trans)historical precursors of extraordinary 
bodily relationships with data, in its multiple coded perceptual-linguistic 
forms, as protosemantic dispositifs and refractors of governance. Within a 
datocratic environment it could be said that we are on equal terms with data, 
but that balance of power is continually shifting through a series of symbiotic, 
ideological and affective relationships. There is a tipping point between 
cultural mastery and over identification; the competing agencies now at play 
in our relation with cultural entities are synonymous with the ‘liberogenic’ 
freedom of neoliberalism, wherein we are compelled to be free to choose, and 
to produce our own cultural fulfilment, having already been fully atomised in 
all aspects of our material and immaterial lives, in line with the production of 
human capital and manifold externalised subjectivities. Hence, Datocracy is an 
auditory, verbal and conceptual amalgam of data, democracy, totalitarian, de 
Tocqueville, and crass tyranny. It sits between the constraint of the word – the 
inscribed form – and the freedom of the utterance; it is this space that I would 
like to explore, and ultimately question whether the utterance, in its passage 
from the ‘infomantic’ body, might provide a protosemantic liberation of data 
from itself. 
 
                                                        
1 Datocracy is my own term created in a series of playful neologisms, including 
infomanticism, LouisQuatorzisation, and methodology maudite, all of which 
correspond to my thinking around the reconstitution of cultural value in post-digital, 
economy-of-attention realm. 
The motif of the severed finger functions as a performative dispositif to 
demonstrate how a single entity can acquire a ‘strange freedom’, in the words 
of French theorist Georges Bataille (1897-1962), and separate itself from 
previous contexts, influences, hierarchies, and lineages in order to return in a 
new system of relations. The severed finger is not just an object of exchange 
conveying use value or meaning, nor is it merely poetically pleasurable, but it 
carries through Bataille the wider role of sacrifice, signifying a necessary 
rupture within the self and within the wider social order (Bataille 1985). 
German philosopher and critical theorist Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) 
understands the imperative democratic function of separation that technology 
affords between the art object and its aura, allowing film as social apparatus 
both to produce and fuse the heterogeneity of its audience. This same 
separation is equally open to manipulation in the interests of capital and 
fascism, moreover (Benjamin 2008). For Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin 
(1895-1975), words are the medium that is the most sensitive and complicated 
refraction of socioeconomic governance. He finds through French Renaissance 
scholar François Rabelais (c.1494-1553) a new conception of value that 
liberates habitual representational matrices and separates false unities to 
forge new unexpected relations of objects and phenomena that are born in the 
verbal (Bakhtin 1981). The written word precedes the spoken word as virus 
erupting from diseased apes, according to American author and artist 
William S. Burroughs (1914-1997) who calls for the cutting up and replaying 
of audio material to subvert the political order and create associations that 
stick. Sound is separated from its source and words fragmented and 
disconnected so that only the tone of voice remains (Burroughs 2005).  
 
The dispositif fully emerges as a theoretical concept in the 1970s, notably 
within French film theory, and successively in the writings of French 
philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) for whom the dispositif is the 
strategic connection or system of relations between heterogeneous elements 
(Foucault 1980, pp.194–195). Foucault’s dispositif is dynamic, productive and 
panoptic in relation to historically specific power structures and knowledge. 
The productive aspect of the Foucauldian dispositif manifests itself in a 
regulatory capacity as through, for example, governmentality and biopolitics 
that produce new rationalities for population control and the regulated 
production of life itself. French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) 
transcribes the outwardly regulatory nature of Foucault’s dispositif into a 
function of ingested, immanent control through which creativity, 
transformation and production combine to produce the new, the current. 
Referring specifically to curves of enunciation as key dimensions of the social 
apparatus, Deleuze emphasises the combined autopoietic and controlling 
powers of apparatuses (1992b, p.164). In his essay ‘Postscript on the Societies 
of Control’ Deleuze expands on what he considers to be a metamorphosis 
from Foucault’s societies of discipline into societies of ingested or immanent 
control. He attributes William Burroughs with naming ‘Control’ as the regime 
of this ‘new monster’ in which ‘liberating and enslaving forces confront one 
another’, and in which individuals have become ‘dividuals, and masses, 
samples, data, markets, or banks’ (Deleuze 1992a, pp.4–5). We will return to 
Burroughs through the three other male Bs of Bataille, Benjamin and Bakhtin. 
 
In ‘Sacrificial Mutilation and the Severed Ear of Vincent Van Gogh’ (1930), 
Bataille discusses the case of Gaston F. who severed his own finger in an act 
of automutilation, apparently following the influence of Dutch painter (1853-
1890) Van Gogh’s auricular automutilation. Bataille suggests that this implied 
causality is coincidental; he proposes that:  
 
Once a decision is reached with the violence necessary for the tearing off 
of a finger, it entirely eludes the literary suggestions that may have 
preceded it; the order that the teeth had to carry out so brusquely must 
appear as a need that no one could resist’ (Bataille 1985, p.62).  
 
Bataille suggests that the irresistible need produced by the external force 
manifest in the coincidence of the two automutilative gestures assumes a 
‘strange freedom’ that anaesthetises the requisite pain accompanying such 
actions. Bataille moves through the specificities of Van Gogh’s ‘overwhelming 
relations...maintained with the sun’ conveyed through a reading of the 
relations of objects in his paintings to arrive at the abstracted theme, relation, 
or mechanism of sacrifice. This allows him to deploy ‘the return of the theme 
in a new system of relations’. He questions the validity of his own mechanism 
that makes an associative leap between seemingly singular mad gestures and 
veritable social functions, and answers his question with a litany of diverse, 
global and transhistorical cultural examples that involve some form of 
mutilation to the self or others, including a detailed account of various 
practices of the ‘ablation of a finger’ (Bataille 1985, p.66-69). The apotheosis is 
reached when sacrificer and sacrificed eventually become one in the form of 
the self-sacrificing god, in a self-reflexive co-mingling of elements. From this 
conflated position, Bataille is confidently able to relate Gaston F.’s finger to 
Prometheus’ famous liver. Having completed the association, Bataille further 
abstracts the sacrificial mechanism to its essence as standing for any form of 
‘radical alteration of the person which can be indefinitely associated with any 
other alteration that arises in collective life’ (such as the death of a relative, 
initiation rites, harvest rituals, et cetera). It has the power to ‘liberate the 
heterogeneous elements and to break the habitual homogeneity of the 
individual’ such as in the gesture of vomiting communal food. For in its 
essence, sacrifice signifies the rejection of that which had been appropriated 
by a person or a group, and the ‘horrifying eruption’ entailed in sacrifice or 
automutilation effects the liberating ‘disgorging of a force that threatens to 
consume’. Bataille continues: 
 
The one who sacrifices is free – free to indulge in a similar disgorging, free, 
continuously identifying with the victim, to vomit his own being just as he has vomited 
a piece of himself or a bull, in other words free to throw himself suddenly outside of 
himself, like a gall or an aissaouah (Bataille 1985, p.70). 
 
Sacrifice signifies for Bataille, then, both a rupture within the self and within 
the social order, and at the same time a necessary function to maintain that 
order, or system of relations.2 
 
In this respect, Bataille’s correlation of a non-teleological violent gesture to a 
function of social significance can be connected to the concept of the 
protosemantic, signifying on the one hand a ‘prestage to linguistic meaning’ 
(Leinfellner 2001, p.227), and on the other, the creation of ‘associations 
between words, or between words and objects, that are initially arbitrary 
(such as a new item of vocabulary and the object it refers to) that will come to 
be incorporated into a semantic network as a function of repeated exposure’ 
(Seel 2011, p.2714). The convulsive singular act, the meaningless bloody 
severance – as metonymic protosemantic utterance – thus enters a new, 
transhistorical system of relations, and becomes discourse.  
 
In his famous 1936 essay, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility’, Walter Benjamin describes as an act of separation the effect 
of technology on the art object. Technological reproduction not only separates 
the art object from its aura – an effect produced by the here and now of the 
singular work of art, its unique existence in a particular place – but becomes a 
symptomatic process extending far beyond the realm of art. For Benjamin, 
reproductive technology such as film enacts a ‘destructive, 
cathartic...liquidation of the value of tradition in the cultural heritage’ 
(Benjamin 2008, p.22). This becomes an exhortation for the masses to take 
control of technology in order to release themselves from their ‘enslavement 
to the powers of the apparatus’ and not only preserve their humanity, but 
also to take heed from the film actor who places that apparatus ‘in the service 
of his triumph’ (Benjamin 2008, p.31). Just as Bataille’s severed finger becomes 
                                                        
2 Julia Kristeva later names this function ‘abjection’ (Kristeva 1982). 
 
a unified symbol of (self)sacrifice and social cohesion, the unified fragments 
of the film actor’s estranged performance are reflected in an apparatic mirror 
that is detachable and transportable, to arrive in front of the masses. The 
balance now tips in the relation of control from the alienated actor awakening 
an empowered audience, to the cultish corruption of fascism through film 
capital. Benjamin also anticipates here the rise of the ‘prosumer/produser’, 
suggesting that film audiences have become quasi-expert, that any person can 
lay claim to being filmed, and that readers have turned into writers with an 
explosion of opportunities for writing and publishing through both the work 
situation and media. Benjamin also anticipates a mode of post-Fordist human 
capital when he claims that ‘work itself is given a voice’. Actors, he suggests, 
are no longer actors, but people portraying themselves (2008, p.34). Likewise, 
within a neoliberal economy, as workers we portray ourselves, described thus 
by cultural theorist Michel Feher (France, 1956-): ‘my human capital is me, as 
a set of skills and capabilities that is modified by all that affects me and all 
that I effect’ (Feher 2009, p.26).  
 
The explosion by film of the prison-world of the everyday offers a new 
relation of the masses to the world: in its micro-specificity, temporal-material 
distortion and topographical promiscuity, film offers new perspectives onto 
that world, as well as a potential outside. It provides an alternative model, a 
new law: a new dispositif. Benjamin declares: ‘The most important social function 
of film is to establish equilibrium between human beings and the apparatus’ (2008, 
p.37). Film, as apparatus and social index, both produces and fuses the 
heterogeneity of its audience.  
 
The novel performs for Mikhail Bakhtin a similar function as the film for 
Walter Benjamin in defining relations between individuals and society. For 
Bakhtin, literary texts are utterances tied to particular social subjects in 
specific historical situations, presenting a form of communication and 
knowledge. The novel is singled out from other genres by Bakhtin for its 
ability to combine in a single space an extraordinary variety of social 
languages and, as such, play a dynamic role in shaping, rather than merely 
reflecting, cultural history. From his analysis of the novel, Bakhtin extracts a 
broader philosophy of ‘novelness’, at the heart of which remains the principle 
of dialogue. Just as a novel is intertextual as both an encounter with plural 
forms of dialogue and texts outside of itself, so novelness functions as a form 
of dispositif in its conjoining of heterogeneous orders of experience, each with 
its own discourse, in dialogue with one another. Bakhtin saw the individual 
as being striated by the social, with the relation between inner and outer 
speech, psyche or world less as a dialectical opposition, than differing 
positions on a shared continuum under the same jurisdiction, namely words: 
‘the medium which is the most sensitive and at the same time the most 
complicated refraction of socioeconomic governance’ (Voloshinov 1976, 
p.87).3 
 
Authorship and perception, then, are forms of governance with the power to 
attribute more or less subjectivity to characters and, within our dialogic 
relations with others, we author ourselves. "I" is an empty shifter, a shared 
tool or dispositif that is passed around like the single shared eye of the fates in 
Greek mythology (Holquist 1990, p.28). It is Renaissance author Rabelais who 
conducts, according to Bakhtin, the ‘most remarkable experiment to re-
establish the fully exteriorised individual’, and who provides a radical model 
of the chronotope, a particular literary spatio-temporal apparatus. In his novel 
The Life of Gargantua and Pantagruel (c.1532-c.1564), Rabelais establishes a new 
relationship to value wherein everything considered to be of value has the 
power to expand spatially and temporally. This underlying category of 
growth is in direct contradistinction to the dominant feudal and religious 
world view where values are presented in direct opposition to spatial-
                                                        
3 It is contested that Bakhtin published a number of works under the names of 
different authors, Voloshinov being one of them. See Holquist 1990, p.193. 
 
temporal reality (the great being symbolised by the small, the eternal by the 
moment, et cetera). Bakhtin attributes this turn with a conscious desire by 
Rabelais to purge the spatial and temporal world of transcendent remnants, 
so as to create a new chronotope for a ‘new, whole and harmonious man, and 
for new forms of human communication’ (Bakhtin 1981, p.168). Rabelais’ 
idiosyncratic methodology involves the destruction of all ordinary ties and 
‘habitual matrices’ of things and ideas so as to create instead unexpected 
matrices and connections, with surprising logical links ("allogisms") and 
linguistic connections, including false connections and associations. Bakhtin 
describes Rabelais’ rationale as liberatory and revolutionary, emphasising the 
materiality of his method: 
 
It is necessary to liberate all these objects and permit them to enter into the free 
unions that are organic to them, no matter how monstrous these unions might 
seem from the point of view of ordinary, traditional associations. These objects 
must be permitted to touch each other in all their living corporeality, and in the 
manifold diversity of the values they bear. It is necessary to devise new 
matrices between objects and ideas that will answer to their real nature, to once 
again line up and join together those things that had been falsely disunified 
and distanced from one another – as well as to disunite those things that had 
been falsely brought into proximity. On the basis of this new matrix of objects, 
a new picture of the world necessarily opens up – a world permeated with an 
internal and authentic necessity (1981, p.169). 
 
In order to perform this process of demolition and reconstruction Rabelais 
builds a series of intersecting yet widely varying themes that centre around 
bodily acts. The intense corporeality of the series offers for Bakhtin a new 
positive material relation of the body to the world, a concrete reality that 
Rabelais presents in great complexity and depth in order to destroy the 
medieval ascetic other-worldly ideology and the incumbent symbolic abyss it 
created between word and body, which was perceived solely under the sign 
of decay and strife. Rabelais thereby restores not only a language and 
meaning to the body but also simultaneously returns a materiality and reality 
to language and meaning (Bakhtin 1981, p.171). Rabelais combines in one 
dynamic, living and grotesque image of bodily deformities and perversions, a 
new and unexpected matrix of objects and phenomena that, Bakhtin stresses, 
are born in the verbal: ‘Whatever direct contact these objects and phenomena 
had with the body was brought about, first and foremost, via a verbal matrix, 
their verbal compacting into a single context, a single phrase, a single 
compound word’ (Bakhtin 1981, p.176). Rabelais deploys this new matrixial 
paradigm structurally to undermine language in its representation of a fixed 
world view, making use of the ‘special logic of profanity’ to construct through 
an unbridled phantasmagoria a verbal series of objects that, as Bakhtin states, 
are in themselves reasonable, but become monstrous when linked together. 
Both Bataille and Burroughs would certainly appreciate Rabelais’ highly 
detailed sausage series with its grotesque obsession with ratified genealogical 
sequence, as recounted by Bakhtin:  
 
Starting with the shape of a sausage, Rabelais proves, relying on various 
authorities, that the serpent that bit Eve was a sausage, that the ancient giants 
who had stormed Mount Olympus and who had tried to pile Mount Pelion on 
Ossa were half sausage. Melusine was also half sausage, as was Erichthonius, 
the inventor of the hearse and the cart ... etc, etc (1981, p.181). 
 
Other such unexpected matrices include the theme of arse wiping in the 
defecation series that enumerates and qualifies the various methods and 
items used, including a March cat, a basket and a baby goose. 
 
William Burroughs, in The Electronic Revolution (1970), considers the word 
itself as flesh, as a virus and agent of control. He postulates that, contrary to 
general assumption, the spoken word, as we know it, came after the written 
word. It is ‘WRITING’ that forms the crucial distinction between humans and 
other animals, exclusively allowing them to communicate remotely through 
time and space (Burroughs 2005, p.4). In this respect, the written word is the 
dispositif that produces colonisation through language. Burroughs’ theory of 
the word as virus, which he derives from a scientist ‘who really thinks about 
his subject instead of merely correlating data’ (2005, p.5), stems back to an 
evolutionary moment when a deadly virus contorted the throats of apes 
allowing for the genetic conveyance (through sexual frenzy brought on by the 
virus itself) and henceforth perceptibly benign assimilation of speech 
(Burroughs 2005, p.6). 
 
As the conjoining of word and image, the written word is the virus that 
makes the spoken word possible. The written word is the ground, we could 
say, for the figure of the spoken word. Humans are separated from animals 
through the dispositif of the written word, which itself is conjoined to the flesh 
of humans: the word as virus is not an allegorical comparison, as Burroughs 
states, ‘a virus IS a very small unit of word and image’ (2005, p.7). Burroughs 
takes a tiger’s leap to conjoin the origins of written history, the hieroglyph, 
the Garden of Eden, and Mayan sacrifice, with the Watergate scandal to 
demonstrate how such units of word and image ‘can be biologically activated 
to act as communicable virus strains’ (2005, p.7). In the same way that 
Benjamin exhorts the masses to expropriate film capital and the medium as a 
whole to avert fascist manipulation, so The Electronic Revolution is a call to 
arms by Burroughs to rewrite history by literally intervening in the mass 
media using everyday technology which does not require ‘God or super 
technicians from outer space’ to operate and to change the news through a 
heterogeneous mix of everyday media. He writes: ‘Playing back recordings of 
an accident can produce another accident. ... Riot sound effects can produce 
an actual riot in a riot situation. RECORDED POLICE WHISTLES WILL 
DRAW COPS. RECORDED GUNSHOTS, AND THEIR GUNS ARE OUT’ 
(2005, pp.10–13). Sound becomes disconnected from its source. Rumours fly; 
people don’t know where they heard it but they heard it; words themselves 
can be disconnected so that only the tone of voice remains.  
  
Scrambling messages is also a powerful ideological weapon, capable of 
imposing thought control on a mass scale, and inducing in the subject the 
impression that the message contains, writes Burroughs, ‘his very own ideas 
which just occurred to him, which indeed it did’ (2005, p.16). On the contrary, 
recognition or suspicion by the subject of the ‘extraneous origins of voices 
that are literally hatching out in his head’ will induce paranoid psychosis, 
which returns us to Bataille’s case of Gaston F. who interpreted as a 
scrambled message from Van Gogh a command from the sun to bite off his 
own finger. Therefore cut/up and playback techniques produce not only 
ideological effects, but also material symptoms. The line between user and 
used remains permeable in the datocratic landscape, however, and the very 
conception of emancipated participation can soon become the shackled 
mantra of unthinking gestures that serve merely to replicate the communal 
bodily virus, as Burroughs suggests: 
 
If you want to, scramble yourself out there, every stale joke, fart, chew, sneeze, 
and stomach rumble. If your trick no work you better run. Everybody doing it, 
they all scramble in together and the populations of the earth just better settle 
down a nice even brown colour. Scrambles is the democratic way, the way full 
cellular representation. Scrambles is the American way (2005, p.24). 
 
The idea of taking control of apparatuses can merely embed one further 
within the apparatic system. Therefore, Burroughs proposes an intervention 
in language itself. He calls for an eradication of the definite article: THE, 
which denies the possibility of any other, and should be replaced by A. 
Further, Burroughs proposes a language comprised of tones, hieroglyphs and 
silences that will ‘delete these virus mechanisms and make them impossible 
of formulation in the language’ (2005, p.35).  
 
In this respect Burroughs presents a model in which, through a self-reflexive 
enunciative auto-cannibalism, data might enact its own liberation from itself. 
Bataille would configure this as a self-vomiting or self-sacrifice. And Bakhtin 
would reject any firm positioning or inward/outward (endo/ecto) directional 
impulse, suggesting that we are already in continually variable positions on 
the spectrum between unique utterances and the social realm; we are our own 
vomit, our own media and, as such, affective material ‘infomantic’ entities 
within the datocratic landscape.4 Moreover, given that there is no notional 
outside to this landscape, we might rather clear within it a greater space for 
the protosemantic, as a way both to destabilise and materially reconfigure 
more imaginative value relations.  
 
                                                        
4 I explore the concept of ‘infomanticism’, a conjoining of information and 
Romanticism that reflects on and through our narcissistic mediation with sublime 
data, in QGJCPLB (Frearson 2013) 
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